Introduction
The global financial crisis, a looming global recession, and deep turmoil in credit markets drive home the importance of developing a global climate architecture that can withstand major economic disruptions. A well-designed global climate regime and the attendant domestic implementation policies undertaken by participating countries need to be resilient to large and unexpected changes in economic growth, technology, energy prices, demographic trends, and other factors that drive costs of abatement and emissions. Ideally, the climate regime would not exacerbate macroeconomic shocks, and would possibly buffer them instead, while withstanding defaults by individual members. Because climate policy must endure indefinitely in order to stabilize atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases, all sorts of shocks will occur at some stage in the policy's existence. Anticipating such shocks may mean rejecting policies that might reduce emissions reliably in stable economic conditions but would be vulnerable to collapsewith consequent deterioration in environmental outcomes-in volatile conditions. Macroeconomic volatility is the practical manifestation of an issue that has received considerable attention in the theoretical literature on the design of environmental policies: uncertainty about the costs and benefits of reducing emissions. 1 In particular, macroeconomic shocks can cause the cost of regulation to be much higher or lower than anticipated. Unexpectedly stringent and costly regulations may become political lightening rods. Recent world events, for example, highlight the fact that economic surprises can subject governments to enormous pressures to relax or repeal taxes or other policies perceived to impede economic growth. For a climate policy to survive future shocks, therefore, it must have dynamic consistency: it must be optimal for each government to continue to enforce the policy even when confronted with sharp departures from the conditions expected when the governments undertook the commitments. All else equal, a climate regime that exacerbates downward macroeconomic shocks or depresses the benefits of positive macroeconomic shocks would be more costly and less stable than a system that better handles global business cycles and other volatility.
The stability of the policy has important environmental implications for two reasons.
First, collapse of the policy could set back progress on emissions reductions for years. Second, decisions of economic actors depend on their expectations of future policy, and this dependency affects the performance of the policy itself. 2 In the case of climate change, a system that is more robust to shocks, and is thus more likely to persist, would increase the expected payoffs of investments in new technologies and emissions reductions relative to a system that is less robust.
In particular, a system of rigid and ambitious targets may seem the most environmentally rigorous approach, but if the rigidity decreases the probability the agreement would be ratified, or reduces compliance, or limits long term participation, households and firms will take that into account in their investment decisions. They will invest too little in abatement and alternative energy technologies, causing the system to be less effective in practice that one with more flexibility. If governments try to compensate for low credibility by imposing more a stringent target, they could inadvertently worsen the incentives for investment by further reducing the program's credibility. This all points to the central importance of establishing a regime that is credibly robust to changing economic conditions. This paper uses the G-Cubed model to explore how shocks in the global economy propagate differently depending on the design of the climate policy regime. G-Cubed divides the world economy into ten regions: the U.S., the E.U., Japan, Australia, the rest of the OECD, Former Soviet Union states, China, India, other developing countries, and oil exporting developing countries. 3 We examine two kinds of shocks relevant to recent experience: (1) a positive shock to economic growth in China, India, and other developing countries, and (2) a sharp decline in housing markets and a rise in global equity risk premiums, causing severe financial distress in the global economy. We analyze the effects of each shock on key economic indicators for the first decade after the shock occurs. We compare the results from the three climate regimes and draw inferences about which approaches may offer participants the strongest incentives to sustain participation in the regime in the context of these economic disruptions.
The three regimes we consider are a system of targets and timetables, a globally coordinated tax on carbon, and a hybrid of the two. The "target and timetables" approach we consider is a system of internationally tradable permits for carbon emissions. The globallycoordinated carbon tax sets a common price on carbon in each economy, with each government collecting revenue within its national boundary. The hybrid is a system of national long term permit trading systems with a globally-coordinated maximum price for permits in each year. Economy, Vol. 85, No. 3 (Jun., 1977) , pp. 473-492. The University of Chicago
Press. 3 The model is summarized in Appendix A and described more fully in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) . 4 The hybrid we consider is based on Wilcoxen (1997, 2002a ).
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In each scenario, we hold climate and broader economic policy rules constant. The fiscal deficit of each economy is held at its baseline level, as are tax rates, so changes in tax revenues will result in corresponding changes in government spending. The behavior of each region's central bank follows a region-specific Henderson-McKibbin-Taylor rule with a weight on output growth relative to trend, a weight on inflation relative to trend and a weight on exchange rate volatility. 5 The weights vary across countries with industrialized economies focusing on controlling inflation and output volatility, and developing countries placing a large weight on pegging the exchange rate to the US dollar.
We find that although the climate regimes appear to be similar in their ability to reduce carbon emissions efficiently, they differ importantly in how they affect the transmission of economic disturbances between economies. In particular, a quantity target with an annual cap global emissions can cause unexpectedly high growth in one country to reduce growth in other economies if the rise in the global carbon price caused by higher growth has a larger negative impact on other economies than the transitional spillover of growth through trade. This effect is absent in the price-based regimes of the global carbon tax and the Hybrid. We believe this change in the transmission of growth has important implication for international relations.
Second, in the case of the global financial crisis we find that the quantity target approach misses an opportunity for significant additional low-cost emissions reductions. The global carbon tax and the Hybrid both enable a significantly larger emissions reduction for the same cost due to slower economic activity. On the other hand, the cap system is counter-cyclical: carbon prices fall as the world economy slows, which acts to dampen the economic slowdown.
We discuss each climate policy system in more detail in Section 2 below. Section 3 reviews key sources of uncertainty in the design of climate policy and describes the particular shocks we introduce into the model. Section 4 reviews the results, and Section 5 concludes, with particular emphasis on the policy relevant insights from the study.
Alternative climate policy regimes
Analysts have offered a wide range of alternative frameworks for international climate policy upon the expiry of the Kyoto Protocol in 2012.
6
Each of these approaches has advantages and disadvantages with respect to stability in the face of shocks. Some propose an agreement similar to the Kyoto Protocol with targets and broader participation. Frankel (2007) explains that targets could be indexed to economic growth so that parties do not face unanticipated stringency with strong economic growth or benefit from international allowance sales when their reductions are a result of downturns and rather than determined climate action.
5 See Henderson and McKibbin (1993) and Taylor (1993 -3 - Bodansky (2007) argues that targets and timetables have proven to be politically untenable for those who sat out the Kyoto Protocol and that the successor agreement should be more flexible.
For example, the agreement could include an explicit range of domestic actions that parties could take including taxes, efficiency standards, and indexed targets, with the mix chosen at the discretion of each party. Some combination of targets and timetables for industrialized countries and more flexible provisions for developing countries could emerge as parties seek to expand participation and China and India resist hard national targets.
An agreement that is tailored at least to some extent to different countries' national circumstances is likely. Nonetheless, analysis of more analytically tractable policies is useful.
Analysts have paid particular attention to an international system of binding emissions caps, like the Kyoto Protocol, that reaches a specified target with certainty (at least in principle) and a system of agreed price signals on greenhouse gas emissions, such as a harmonized carbon tax, which promises a certain level of effort but leaves emissions levels uncertain. For example, Nordhaus (2006) and others find that a price signal approach reduces the risk of inadvertent stringency and is likely to be more efficient than a system of hard caps in the context of uncertainty over both the costs and benefits of abatement.
A less-explored characteristic of both systems is how and whether they create political constituencies with incentives to sustain the system. 7 For a discussion of this topic, see Wilcoxen (2002a, 2002b ).
-4 -A hybrid policy first proposed by McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1997) and discussed in detail in Wilcoxen (2002a, 2002b) could combine the best features of taxes and tradable permits. We describe the approach in some detail here because it would address many of the problems that industry dislikes about carbon taxes and many of the problems of uncertain costs and price volatility that arise under a cap and trade permit system.
A country adopting the hybrid policy would create and distribute a set of long-term permits, each entitling the owner to emit a specified amount of carbon every year for the life of the permit. The simplest long-term permit would have no expiration date and would allow one ton of emissions every year forever. The total emissions rights conveyed by the permits would be less than or equal to the country's target emissions in each year. Refinements of this approach could greater reductions over time, for example by gradually reducing the allowed emissions each permit conveys or by creating a set of finitely-lived permits with varying dates of expiration. Once distributed, the long-term permits could be traded among firms, or bought and retired by environmental groups.
In addition to the long term permits discussed above, the government would agree to sell annual permits for a pre-set but increasing fee. There would be no restriction on the number of annual permits sold, but each permit would be good only in the year it is issued. The system provides clear financial incentives for emissions reductions, but the unlimited supply of annual permits means that no particular emissions target is guaranteed. As long as sufficiently few longterm permits are sold such that at least one annual permit is sold, the number of long-term permits only affects the distribution of permit revenue between the private sector and the government; it does not affect the country's total emissions.
The hybrid policy described above is strictly a domestic policy, without international trading in emissions rights. However, an international system of coordinated approaches, for example with common prices for annual permits, would be feasible. This approach would focus negotiations around the price of annual permits across and within participating countries. The treaty could also limit the maximum number of long-term emissions rights a participating country could issue, and individual countries could choose to distribute fewer. For example, parties that prefer a carbon tax could distribute no long-term permits at all.
The hybrid policy has many of the advantages of any system of agreed domestic measures. Importantly, because the permit markets under this policy are separate between countries, shocks to one permit market do not propagate to others. Accession by a new participant has no effect on the permit markets operating in other countries. And if a participating country withdraws from the agreement or fails to enforce its hybrid policy, permit markets in other countries are unaffected.
Sources of uncertainty and shocks
Many uncertainties affect the optimal climate policy and the willingness of individual countries to undertake binding international commitments. A key uncertainty is the cost of complying with any given commitment, making it risky for a country to agree to a hard target that may later prove to be infeasible. Uncertainty in economic growth, energy prices, and the development and cost of abatement technologies all contribute to uncertainty in costs. 8 Because these factors are not necessarily correlated, together they could amplify or attenuate the overall stringency of the program. For example, higher than expected macroeconomic growth would increase the stringency of a given cap, but if accompanied by the development of technologies with lower than expected abatement costs, the net effect of these dual shocks could be modest.
But at its core, the targets and timetables approach requires each participant to achieve its national emissions target regardless of the cost of doing so. Even if the targets are indexed to factors correlated with the feasibility of the target, the basic approach does not bound costs. We examine a second pertinent shock in Section 4. To model a financial crisis roughly of the magnitude of one unfolding in the fall of 2008, we impose an unexpected fall in the return to housing in each economy, with the largest drop occurring in the United States. We add to this an exogenous rise in the equity risk premium in all sectors in all economies. Together, the shocks causes a substantial financial crisis including a sharp fall in equity markets, declines in household wealth, a sharp contraction in consumption, a jump in the required rate of return on investment, and a sharp decline in investment. These adjustments lead to a global recession.
Methodology and Results
In this section we use a global economic model called G-Cubed to explore the uncertainty in costs for different countries. Table 1 We begin by generating a baseline projection with an emissions reduction path as set out in detail in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2008) . 10 Along this path we consider three regimes. The first is a global cap and trade system for carbon dioxide emissions. Under this policy, we assume 9 See McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) for a complete description. The version of G-Cubed used in this paper is 80J.
10 See McKibbin, Pearce and Stegman (2007) for a discussion of the importance of structural change in undertaking long term projections.
-7 -that each country is allocated permits based on its emissions trajectory expected before the growth shock. The second regime is an optimal global carbon tax calculated to give the same global emissions as the cap and trade system. The third regime is the McKibbin Wilcoxen Hybrid which also has a common global price for carbon but is implemented at the national level.
All three regimes are normalized so that they start with the same carbon prices in each economy and the same global emissions outcome. We assume in each case that the regimes are in place when the shocks hit.
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We solve the model under each regime with and without the unexpected shocks and examine the differences between the paired simulations. Under the shocks presented here, the global carbon tax and the Hybrid are both carbon taxes at the margin, so for clarity we report a single set of results under the heading "Price-Based Policy."
12 In contrast, the cap and trade system is listed as "Permit System."
The main difference between the price-based policies and the cap and trade permit system is that the latter is less flexible: in the face of unexpected shocks, the rigid constraint on emissions drives sharp changes in carbon prices, which cause corresponding changes in other variables. Under the price-based systems, in contrast, the carbon price remains fixed at its announced trajectory and emissions can adjust.
13
11 This approach was chosen to illustrate how each shock affects the global economy under each regime. Clearly this is not a reflection of current state of global climate policy. 12 The carbon tax and the Hybrid policy would not be equivalent under a more severe shock to the world economy.
If the shock were sufficiently damaging, the demand for emissions permits in one or more countries might drop low enough that no annual permits would be sold in that country. In that case, carbon prices would vary across countries and the Hybrid would have some of the counter-cyclical properties of a pure permit system. In the results presented here, however, the demand for permits is large enough that at least a few annual permits are sold under all circumstances. 13 Under the Hybrid, fluctuations in economic conditions cause swings in the sales of annual permits. 
Developing country growth shock
As mentioned in Section 3, one of the scenarios we consider is an unexpected rise in growth rates in developing countries (China, India, and LDCs in the model). The particular shock we analyze is an unexpected increase in labor productivity growth of three percent per year for 16 years, after which growth returns to baseline rates. Only growth rates return to the baseline: the three economies are permanently larger.
Results for a range of variables for all countries are included in Table 2 , which shows percentage deviations from baseline for years 1, 5 and 10 for both the growth shock discussed in this section and the risk shock to be discussed below. Also shown are the differences in percentage deviation between the permit and price systems. Figure 2 shows the change in key -9 -economic variables in China due to the shock under two different climate regimes: a global permit trading system ("Permit System", shown by squares), and a price system ("Price", shown by triangles). The rise in productivity expands the effective supply of labor to each economy, rapidly increasing output in each sector and therefore raising GDP. At the same time, the increase in labor productivity raises the marginal product of capital sharply across the Chinese economy. This increase in the return to capital causes a large rise in private investment of close to twenty percent. The higher investment is financed partly from capital inflows (hence the trade balance worsens) and partly from higher savings, hence consumption take a number of years to rise to the permanently higher level. The lagged adjustment of consumption captures an important historical feature of the Chinese economy. In G-Cubed, the People's Bank of China is modeled as placing a large weight on the exchange rate in its reaction function and small weights on the deviation in growth from trend and the deviation of inflation from the target. To prevent the exchange rate from appreciating, the bank cuts interest rates. There is an initial spike in inflation due to strong demand and the loosening of monetary policy. Carbon emissions rise significantly due to the increase in energy use from higher GDP growth. Under a global cap on emissions, the rise in developing country growth causes the global price of carbon to rise (see the rows labeled "Carbon Price, US$, Permits" under the "Growth Shock" columns in Table 2) which acts as a slight brake on the growth of all other countries, even including China. This is particularly true for China because it has a low marginal abatement cost: the GDP outcome for
China when a binding global carbon target is in place is slightly smaller than when China only has a fixed carbon price. Obviously in the case of a fixed carbon price, emissions rise above the target in the baseline. There is not much flexibility to adjust energy inputs in the short run but in the long run there is substitution away from carbon-intensive activities as the expected future carbon price rises. Although growth is only marginally lower, the emissions pathway over time is significantly different under the two climate policy regimes. This illustrates that expectations about future carbon prices and the credibility of the policy regime can make a big difference in the ability of economies to reduce carbon emissions without large effects on economic growth.
countries to which the growth is most prone to spill over. Figure 3 shows detailed results for the United States from higher growth in developing countries. (Table 2 shows results for all countries.) As capital flows out on the United States toward higher returns in developing countries, the US trade balance improved slightly and the US capital stock initially falls along with consumption due to the global re-allocation of capital. As developing countries grow further, this effect eventually reverses due to higher global incomes. In the short term, the monetary rule in the model used to represent the behavior of the Federal Reserve causes interest rates to fall, both because growth is initially lower in the US but also because cheaper goods from developing countries lowers US inflation.
When a global carbon constraint is present, the transmission of the shock is supplemented by the rise in the global carbon price (see Table 2 ). In the longer run, higher -10 -carbon prices reduce the positive effect of higher developing country growth on the US. In the short run, relatively lower developing country growth reduces the amount of capital that flows out of the United States and dampens the negative transmission of the shock for about the first three years. These results clearly demonstrate that hard targets for emissions at the global level can amplify uncertainties even when international permit trading is allowed. Such uncertainties could be a significant barrier to countries taking the first step to implement effective climate policy, and the barrier is higher than it would be under a price based system.
The strong growth of developing countries transmits positively to other countries directly via trade flows with developing countries and indirectly through higher global wealth and increased trade flows more generally. The benefits of productivity growth in one country are also transmitted through international capital flows responding to the return to capital.
Capital achieves a higher rate of return in rapidly growing economies and the resulting capital flows raise incomes globally. Developing countries that have the productivity boom (China, India and LDCs) experience higher growth under a price-based system than a permit system because marginal abatement costs do not rise and slow activity in the former climate regime.
The effect of a cap in depressing the benefits of the positive growth shock is largest in
Rise in global risk: a financial crisis
The second shock we consider is a global financial crisis. We represent the crisis as a rise in the equity risk premium in all sectors in all countries. It increases by ten percent in the first year and then declines by one percent per year until year six. From year six on, the risk premium is five percent above baseline forever. In addition we introduce a permanent fall in the -11 -productivity of housing in all countries. The reduction is five percent in all countries other than the US and ten percent in the US. This is intended to capture a housing bubble bursting.
14 Figure 8 contains the results for a number of key variables for the United States. Note that this shock is relatively symmetric across all countries in contrast to the growth shock, which was only occurring in the developing world. The rise in risk and the fall in housing productivity leads to a portfolio reallocation away from equities and housing into government bonds in all countries. This drives up bond prices and drives down real interest rates. Housing prices and equity prices drop sharply. The required return to capital rises sharply when the risk premium is taken into account. With a given capital stock, the actual return to capital is too low after the shock and thus investment collapses (eventually driving the marginal product higher as the capital stock shrinks). Consumption drops sharply because of the sharp decline in real wealth resulting from sharply lower equity prices and sharply lower housing prices. Because the housing shock is larger in the United States, capital also flows out of the United States to other countries and hence the US trade balance improves. With the large shifts in aggregate demand, US GDP falls by four percent-a recession in terms of economic growth. GDP remains below baseline for the decade, although growth rates gradually return to trend after five years and rise above trend for another five years. The monetary reaction function in the model indicates a central bank cut in interest rates of 225 basis points despite a rise in inflation because the output loss is substantial.
The collapse in economic activity leads to a sharp decline in carbon emissions when a price-based system is in place. Under the permit trading system, emissions do not change but carbon prices fall. Within the US, this means that less abatement occurs under the permit policy than under the price-based system. After five years, the difference is five percent of baseline emissions, a large amount of abatement foregone. Note that the difference to US GDP under the alternative climate regimes is very small, which means that an opportunity to cut emissions at much lower economic cost is lost under a global cap relative to a global price based system.
Figures 9 and 10 show the change in carbon emissions under the two climate regimes.
The price-based regimes deliver much larger emission cuts for little additional economic cost over time. The global quantity target regime delivers the same emissions reduction as planned along the baseline before the shocks hit but the price of carbon falls significantly (see the "Risk Shock" columns in Table 2 ). This has secondary effects on the induced technological innovations that would be required to reduce future emissions at low cost. It is likely that if this actually occurred, the credibility of the cap regime would be undermined due to the inflexibility in the originally negotiated global emissions target.
14 See McKibbin and Stoeckel (2006).
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Summary and Conclusions for Policy
The global financial crisis of 2008 has a starkly emphasized a number of important lessons for the design of global and national climate policy. These lessons need to be considered explicitly during international negotiations on a new treaty to succeed the Kyoto Protocol after then end of the protocol's 2008-2012 commitment period.
The first lesson is that any policy framework whose costs or benefits depend strongly on forecasts of the future state of the world or national economic conditions is likely to fail because the forecast is likely to be wrong. Countries committing to targets and timetables for emissions reductions are committing to a policy with highly uncertain costs. A global climate framework needs to endure even in the face of the wide variety of shocks that will undoubtedly occur over the coming decades. Thus there must be a mechanism built into the framework that directly addresses the issue of cost uncertainty. Otherwise, it will be much harder to negotiate a broad agreement, and the agreement may be vulnerable to collapse under adverse future shocks.
The second lesson is that it is critical to get the global and national governance structures right. There must be a clear regulatory regime in each country and a transparent way to smooth out excessive short-term volatility in prices. A system that enables or even encourages short term financial speculation in climate markets may collapse at huge expense to national economies. A hybrid system provides many of the advantages of a permit system while limiting opportunities for speculation through the annual permit mechanism. It provides a strong mix of market incentives and predictable government intervention.
The third lesson is that since shocks in one part of the world will certainly occur, the global system needs to have adequate firewalls between national climate systems to prevent destructive contagion from propagating local problems into a system-wide failure. A global cap and trade system, or alternative systems such as Stern (2006) or the Garnaut Review (2008), would be extremely vulnerable to shocks in any single economy. A system based on national hybrid policies, on the other hand, would be explicitly designed to partition national climate markets and limit the effects of a collapse in climate policy in one part of the world on climate markets elsewhere.
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This paper has explored these issues by examining the effects of shocks that have actually occurred in the past decade: a surprising surge of economic growth in developing countries and a global financial crisis. Quantity-based approaches such as a global permit trading regime tend to buffer some kinds of macroeconomic shocks: carbon prices rise and fall with the business cycle. However, price-based approaches such as a global carbon tax (levied at the national level) or a McKibbin Wilcoxen Hybrid would provide stronger firewalls to prevent adverse events in one carbon market from causing a collapse of the global system. 15 For further discussion of the advantages of this point see McKibbin and Wilcoxen (2002 , 2004 , 2008 .
Appendix A: The G-Cubed Model
The G-Cubed model is an intertemporal general equilibrium model of the world economy. The theoretical structure is outlined in McKibbin and Wilcoxen (1998) • In order to track the macro time series, the behavior of agents is modified to allow for short run deviations from optimal behavior either due to myopia or to restrictions on the ability of households and firms to borrow at the risk free bond rate on government debt.
For both households and firms, deviations from intertemporal optimizing behavior take the form of rules of thumb, which are consistent with an optimizing agent that does not update predictions based on new information about future events. These rules of thumb are chosen to generate the same steady state behavior as optimizing agents so that in the long run there is only a single intertemporal optimizing equilibrium of the model. In the short run, actual behavior is assumed to be a weighted average of the optimizing and the rule of thumb assumptions. Thus aggregate consumption is a weighted average of consumption based on wealth (current asset valuation and expected future after tax labor income) and consumption based on current disposable income. Similarly, aggregate investment is a weighted average of investment based on Tobin's q (a market valuation of the expected future change in the marginal product of capital relative to the cost) and investment based on a backward looking version of Q. 16 Full details of the model including a list of equations and parameters can be found online at: www.gcubed.com 17 These issues include: Reaganomics in the 1980s; German Unification in the early 1990s; fiscal consolidation in Europe in the mid-1990s; the formation of NAFTA; the Asian crisis; and the productivity boom in the US.
18 See Blanchard and Fischer (1989) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) .
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•
There is an explicit treatment of the holding of financial assets, including money. Money is introduced into the model through a restriction that households require money to purchase goods.
• It is important to stress that the term 'general equilibrium' is used to signify that as many interactions as possible are captured, not that all economies are in a full market clearing equilibrium at each point in time. Although it is assumed that market forces eventually drive the world economy to a neoclassical steady state growth equilibrium, unemployment does emerge for long periods due to wage stickiness, to an extent that differs between countries due to differences in labor market institutions. -32 - -37 --38 - 
